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Introduction 
Modern scholars have found several reasons for the long period of 
crisis of the Ottoman Empire, and they disagree only over the relative 
importance of the individual causes. The most often cited reasons for the 
decline are the following: a drastic change in the training, personality and 
activities of the rulers; the growing influence of the enderun (the ones who 
served in the inner part of the Ottoman imperial palace containing the 
ruler’s residence) over state affairs, coupled with factionalism in the birun 
(the ones who served in the imperial palace but outside the residence of 
the imperial family) and the establishment of close ties between the 
members of the inner and outer services; the growing corruption that 
partly was a result of the emergence of these factions; the sudden inflation 
at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, supposedly caused 
by the shift of world trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and by 
the influx of silver from the Americas into the Ottoman Empire; the 
conflict between the old Turkish elements (beys, gazis and sipahis) and the 
descendants of slaves; changes in the organization and composition of the 
military establishment; and finally the inability of the Ottoman Empire to 
expand further (Sugar 1977, 187–95; Lewis 1962). 
According to Turkish and international scholarship, each of these 
phenomena contributed to the steady decline of the Ottoman Empire’s 
power. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the crisis of the 
Ottoman Empire started to become evident for contemporary Europe. 
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According to Mustafa Soykut, the “tremendous invincible” image of the 
Turk that arose following the fall of Constantinople changed to that of the 
“vincible Turk” as a result of the joint Christian victory at Lepanto (1571) 
(Hess 1972). This image changed again during the decades after the 
Ottoman failure in Vienna in 1683, and it became the simple denomination 
“Turk,” and was modified again in the European mentality of the 
eighteenth century, becoming the “nunc innocuous Turk.” This 
development of denominations then culminated in the second half of the 
nineteenth century with the image of the “sick man of Europe” (Soykut 
2006). 
Early modern Europeans emphasized both admirable and frightening 
aspects of Ottoman greatness (dÕUDNPDQ  . The new European 
balance of power and relative stability of the Westphalian system, along 
with the consolidation of power of the old nation-states such as France and 
England, prepared the ground for the more favorable romantic images 
about the Turks, but it also created a tangible change in the European 
attitude towards the Ottoman question. 
Italians played a special role among Western Europeans in this respect. 
On the one hand, many Italian soldiers, military engineers and volunteers 
took part in the Habsburg army’s campaigns, and fought against the 
Ottomans in the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom. On the other, several 
Italian states, especially Venice (Mantran 1985; Kissling 1977) and the 
Papal State, had a direct diplomatic, political and commercial relationship 
with the Ottoman Empire. In the Republic of Venice already in the 
fifteenth century a literary style denominated by Paolo Preto as 
“turchesca” (Preto 1975) had evolved. Thanks to the experience of these 
Italians of various professions and the topicality of the topic of the 
“Turks,” several Italian authors wrote about the Ottomans in different 
genres (diplomatic reports, studies, propagandistic writings, military news, 
literary works etc.) and portrayed Ottoman life, Ottoman customs and the 
Ottoman court. Although the main characteristics of these writings were 
fear of the Ottomans and anti-Muslim propaganda, a number of authors 
recognized that the Ottoman Empire had arrived at a point of decline. But 
the views of the writers in this period were shaped by their personal 
experience and casual observation of Turkish affairs. The prevailing 
images of Ottoman government in this period were unsystematic and 
sporadic. The analysis of the seventeenth-century perceptions of the 
Ottoman system of government in the writings of Venetian ambassadors is 
instructive. These envoys were motivated by empirical observations, 
which emphasized pragmatic and immediate concerns. 
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Now, after this general overview, I would like to analyze two 
characteristic examples of contemporary Italian writings about the 
Ottoman Empire’s decline: first, Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli (Stoye 
1994), a military engineer, erudite and virtuoso; second, the Venetian 
diplomat Carlo Ruzzini (Pedani 2002), former ambassador in Istanbul (the 
so-called bailo). 
Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli 
Count Marsigli was a nobleman from Bologna with various Venetian 
and Papal connections. Marsigli spent a significant part of his life serving 
the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I, fighting against the Ottomans in 
Hungary, practically from the siege of Vienna of 1683 (Cardini 2011) to 
the Peace Treaties of Karlowitz in 1699 (F. Molnár 2013). But he was not 
only a soldier and talented, well-trained military engineer, but also a 
diplomat, a scholar and furthermore a passionate collector: not just of 
books, manuscripts, maps and so on, but of all types of information and 
for this reason more recent scholars describe him also as a spy (Bene 
2006). 
He had an extremely and unusual complex experience of the Turks, 
which he had earned both in Europe and in the core of the empire. First, in 
1679, he went to the court of the sultan with the staff of the new Venetian 
ambassador, Pietro Civrani, and stayed there for eleven months. This first 
journey to Istanbul as a “turista curiosissimo” was determinative from the 
point of view of his knowledge about the Ottomans. Marsigli here started 
collecting data on the recent situation and the military organization of the 
Ottoman Empire. When he returned, he entered the service of Emperor 
Leopold: immediately before the Ottoman siege of Vienna, Marsigli was 
captured and returned to the imperial army only after nine months of 
adventurous Turkish captivity. In addition he participated in various secret 
and official diplomatic missions in Rome and also in Istanbul. At the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Karlowitz (1698–99) he was “councillor 
assistant” of the imperial delegation. After the signing of the peace, the 
emperor appointed Marsigli as the commissioner to the Habsburg-Ottoman 
border demarcation (F. Molnár 2010; Gardi 2011, 98–99). 
Marsigli’s principal work about the Ottomans, entitled Stato militare 
dell‘Impero Ottomano, incremento e decremento del medesimo, was 
published in Italian and in French only two years after his death (Marsigli 
1732). In this book Marsigli summarizes all his knowledge about the 
Ottomans: before analyzing in detail the current state of the military issues 
concerning the Turks, in a number of chapters he describes also the origin 
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and the development of the Ottoman Empire, the differences between the 
ancient and the contemporary Turks, the major extension of the empire, 
the various nations, languages and religions in the empire, the 
temperament of the Turks, all the types of money that they used, their 
trade, and also their incomes and expenses. The main goal of this book 
was to help, by means of information, the project of reconquering the 
European territories occupied by the Ottomans centuries ago, and with the 
description of their weakness, Marsigli intended not only to convince the 
audience that the Ottoman military force that seemed so frightening was in 
reality weak (“ … provar evidentemente quanto sien deboli, e fiacche 
quelle forze, che sono credute sì poderose e terribili” [Marsigli 1732, XII]) 
but also to demonstrate that just like every empire in history, the Ottomans 
too had come from nothing and would return to being nothing: “nulla 
furono gli Ottomani, e nulla saranno.” 
Carlo Ruzzini 
Carlo Ruzzini, a contemporary of Marsigli, was born in Venice and 
started his career in public service at the Venetian arsenal and dockyard; 
then he became a diplomat: he was sent in 1691 as ambassador to Madrid, 
after this to Vienna, and in 1698–99, during the negotiations at Karlowitz, 
he represented Venice. Thereafter Ruzzini was appointed first as Venetian 
ambassador in The Hague, and then from August 1705 to September 1706 
in the Turkish Court as special representative of Venice (ambasciator 
estraordinario) for the congratulations of the accession to the throne of 
Sultan Ahmed III. Ruzzini represented the Republic of Venice also during 
the peace negotiations at Passarowitz, and then went again to Istanbul for 
the ratification of the peace (from May 1719 to October 1720). Finally he 
was elected as doge in 1732 (Mosto 1983; Rendina 2003). During his three 
years’ reign he tried to keep Venice neutral and out of further conflicts. 
From his first journey to Istanbul there is a report, a relazione (Ruzzini 
1996) that he wrote after his return to Venice. In this writing Ruzzini 
focuses on two main issues: the foreign policy state of the empire after the 
defeat suffered at the hands of the Christian monarchs (the so-called 
external situation [stato estremo] and the internal one of the state [stato 
interno] after the most recent revolution [quasi guerra civile]) and the 
change of the sultans. From his second diplomatic mission we have no 
report (relazione), only dispatches (dispacci). 
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Marsigli and Ruzzini about the Ottoman crisis 
It is generally known that given the Ottoman concept of the state, the 
ability of the ruler was fundamental to the empire’s functioning. At the 
turn of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire had 
become institutionalized and depersonalized. The sultan was scarcely 
more than a symbolic node, a primus inter pares at the heart of the system 
of power (Finkel 2007, 328). 
During the secret negotiations for the peace in 1691, Marsigli says that 
the sultan did not even know the real needs of the Ottoman Empire, firstly 
because of his limited capacities, and secondly—and this is the main 
reason—because of the personal interests of the viziers, who hid the reality 
of the situation from the sultan: “Le necessità dell’Imperio Ottomano non 
conosciute dal Sultano per mancanza di cervello et al più delle volte 
coperteli dal privato interesse delli Vesiri” (HHStA, Wien /Staatskanzlei 
Türkei/ Karton 160. f.20.). Then in his book he speaks about the modified 
authority of the sultans and states that all the sultans after Süleyman, 
whom the Turks called “Magnificent,” were in reality mad or tyrants: 
“fossero stati o pazzi o Tiranni del Popolo Musulmanno…” (Marsigli 
1732, 28). Ruzzini reports the same situation, and, speaking about the 
reign of Mustafa II (1695–1703), emphasizes the point that since the 
sovereign had left Istanbul, he lived only for pleasure, under the mufti’s 
influence, by saying the following: 
sultan Mustafa ripposava tra gli ozii, occupato nei piaceri del seraglio e nei 
frequento esercitii delle sue cacce. Trasportò la sua ressidenza in 
Adrianopoli. … e il mufti … havendo saputo ocupar … con qualche forza 
di magia il cuore e la volontà del sovrano. (Ruzzini 1996, 760) 
The Ottoman sovereign was not able to observe the already empty 
rituals, and as a consequence the ruler started to govern by means of 
secular administrative law, the kanuns (Kerekes 2008). With this altered 
style of government, the basis of power was changed: it ceased to be 
absolute. Religious and secular power fell into the hands of the Grand 
Vizier (in Turkish Vezir-i Azam or Sadrazam, the greatest minister of the 
sultan) and WKHùH\KOLVODPFKLHIRIWKHXOHPDWKHFODVVRIOHDUQHGPHQ
the highest authority in the issues of Islam). Regarding the increased 
power of the ulemas and the army, Marsigli and Ruzzini have a similar 
opinion, stating that in this situation they had more power than that of the 
sultan and the viziers together: 
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la Milizia esistente appunto del Gran Signore … divenne arbitra di dar 
carceri, e morte al Sultano, e promuovere al Soglio i Fratelli, o Fili 
dell’Imperatore desposto … Quando questo Corpo tutto della Milizia di 
Costantinopoli è unito all’ordine dell’Ulama … ecco il Sultano, quela Gran 
Signore, quel gran supposto Monarca, passa dal Trono al carcere, se non al 
patibolo, con il Visir. (Marsigli 1732, 31) 
gli ulema declinati, sensibili e potenti. … Le milizie e gli ulema, o siano li 
effendi, sono li ordini supremi dell’impero. Ma se il primo è il braccio, è 
l’altro l’occhio e la mente. (Ruzzini 1996, 764) 
While in the first period of the Empire Ottoman princes had served as 
the governors of provinces, Süleyman the Magnificent adopted the Arab-
Islamic mode of succession through the oldest living male of the family: 
all princes were kept from birth until death in the inner palace. The sultans 
were not present. In other words, the sovereigns were separated from their 
subjects and at the end of the seventeenth century were unsuited to the 
function of a ruler, unable to stand at the head of the multinational 
Ottoman society. Ruzzini and Marsigli speak also about the power 
struggles in the saray, and about the increased power of the women there: 
Hebbero sempre gan forza e gran credito in quella corte le madri de sultani 
e spesso poterono anco erigersi in arbitre delle massime, e del comando. … 
La forza del chislar agà, huomo defforme, eunuco moro, custode delle 
donne: è alto il suo posto appresso il sultano … perchè da lui dipendono 
quelle che sogliono muovere il cuore: le femine. (Ruzzini 1996, 766, 770) 
Both authors emphasize the point that the power of the sultan was great 
only in appearance, and the same was valid also for the authority of the 
pashas (governors of a province): Marsigli (1732, 28) says that it was 
apparently very impressive but was in reality “del gran lunge inferiore a 
cosi strepitoso apparato.” 
The Bolognese count personally experienced the effects of the shifting 
and weakening of power, mostly during the drawing of the borderlines 
following Karlowitz, when they could hardly come to an agreement 
because of the Turks’ misunderstandings: 
Questa dipendenza del Passa particolarmente da Vecchi del Paese l’ho 
sperimentato, ponendo i limiti per Cèsare con la Porta, a tenore della pace 
di Carlowitz, atteso che nè il Commissario della Porta, nè il Passa osava su 
i contrasti arbitrar cosa alcuna contro la volontà, spesse volte brutale de’ 
Vecchi del Paese. Ed in fatti la credenziale del Commissario Turco 
parlando, che dovesse tutto eseguire a tenore delle Tavole Sacre e Sante 
della Pace, col consenso de’Vecchi, risposi in voce e in iscritto che la 
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facesse cambiare e ridurre alla norma di quella che mi è Cesare, fidandosi 
della mia fede. Ne però la Porta volle cambiarla, lasciando all’ignoranza ed 
all’interesse privato d’ogni piccolo Turco confinario l’interpretazione di 
quelle Tavole prima chiamate Sacre e Sante. E quando non si avessero 
avuti nelle mani lochi da demolire e da cedere, dopo stabiliti li limiti, non 
si sarebbe mai venuto allo stabilimento di questi. (Marsigli 1732, 30–31) 
About the leaders of the empire, Ruzzini (1996, 772) writes thus that 
jealousy towards one’s fellows is the strongest law and feeling among 
them, and he also states that there are only a few really talented persons 
among the Turks: “La gelosia del comando vince ogn’altro affetto e 
sprezza ogn’altra legge. … l’impero non è ricco di molti soggetti che siano 
dotati di grande mente.” 
At the end of his book about the Turks, Marsigli summarizes the state 
of the empire after the supplicatory peace of Karlowitz and especially 
Passarowitz, by listing the difficulties of the European part of the empire, 
the lack of money and the absence of well-trained armies and leaders, and 
tries to encourage the Christian world to ally against them, and also 
mentions the possibility of revolts that could destroy the Ottoman Empire: 
… avrebbe il Mondo Christiano visto in quale angustia sarebbe stato 
l’Impero Ottomano in Europa per la diminuazione de danari, per la 
mancanza di Milizia di buona qualità, per la deficienza di esperti Capi, per 
timore de propri Sudditi, di Religione Christiana, non mancando fra loro, 
… che stanno in osservazione di non solo tentare di sottrarsi all’Impero 
Ottomano, mà di farsi anche Principi Nazionali. Di tal sentimento son’pure 
i Turchi a riguardo della casa Ottomana, che dà Solimano il Grande in quà 
la giudicano un seminario di Principi, ò Tiranni, o Effeminati, e per ciò 
l’anno anche ridotta schiava come dissi della Milizia, frà le quali non sarà 
impossibile, che si veggono seditioni, che faranno la distruzione di 
quest’Impero. (Marsigli 1732, 199) 
Meanwhile, the Venetian envoy describes the dissatisfaction among the 
various peoples of this wide multinational empire, and mentions the 
disappointed pashas, but in his view these tensions were only temporary 
ones, and did not mean serious danger for the empire: 
Per altro, nell’estesa ampia di quei paesi vi cresce spesso la zizania e le 
ribellioni. Sono varie le sementi da quali nascono. In alcuni popoli… , che 
intieramente dipendono, spesso vi sono dei malcontenti contro i pasciá che 
li governano. Spesso anco questi compaiscono malcontenti della Porta. Il 
timore delle frequenti mutationi che sopra di essi di fanno, e la facilità che 
per la distanza tengono di sotrarsi dall’insidie degl’emoli e dai pericoli 
della corte, li rende arditi e contumaci. … Ma per la buonasorte di 
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quell’Impero sono tutti questi per il più fochi di paglia, che celermente 
s’accendono e si estinguono. (Ruzzini 1996, 778) 
Marsigli suggests using this opportunity to expel the Turks to remote 
“Arabia” (a plan that was to be partially realized some centuries 
afterwards), proposing that the allied forces should go against the Ottoman 
Empire together at the same time, in order to take possession of the 
territories already divided in the treaties among the allies: 
… avendo maniera di conculcare questa Potenza Ottomana, col fare trà i 
[popoli, stati] Confinanti, e trà i Remoti un’comparto, che tolga le Gelosie 
fatali di uno contro dell’altro,… e liberarne l’Europa e l’Asia, che fu sotto 
l’Impero Greco, con sicurezza di andare, non à combattere, mà à prendere 
il possesso di ciò, che loro avranno nel Trattato di Aleanza diviso. 
(Marsigli 1732, 199) 
On the one hand, Ruzzini stresses that the military force of the 
Ottomans was only virtual, and that they had financial problems; on the 
other, he also explains the crisis by citing psychological and ideological 
reasons: “La cieca obbedienza, la rassegnazione al destino, la stessa fede 
ai dogmi della lor legge, a poco a poco s’inebolisse, e di tal modo i 
pregiuditii giungono sin a scuotere i primi fondamenti della monarchia” 
(Ruzzini 1996, 765). 
In conclusion, we can say that to the phenomena described by 
contemporaries and modern historians as contributing to or signaling 
social, moral, economic and political decline we can add also the 
aforementioned spiritual and ideological causes. Having survived the war 
of 1683–99 and the subsequent loss of territory enshrined in the Karlowitz 
Treaty, the empire recovered, albeit painfully, as it adapted to meet new 
circumstances (Finkel 2007, 328). But the history of the Ottoman Empire 
in the early modern age—considered by contemporaries as a decline—in 
reality was also an important step and part of an ongoing process: from the 
decadence of a traditional society and empire the Ottoman Empire 
gradually transformed itself into a modern state. 
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THE TANZIMAT AND THE STRUGGLE 
OF NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES 
FOR CITIZENSHIP: 
THE SHORT SEASON OF REFORMISM 
WITHIN THE DECLINE 
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
MANUELA BORRACCINO 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the European powers’ 
maritime superiority over the Ottoman Empire, the development of new 
military techniques and of an efficient bureaucracy, the economic 
reorganization due to the commerce with the Americas gradually encircled 
and ended up choking the Sublime Porte. Between 1768 and 1774 the 
Russians seized Crimea. In 1798 Bonaparte launched his expedition to 
Egypt and started the renewal of Egyptian society. In 1821 the Turks were 
expelled from Greece and in 1882 Britain occupied Egypt. 
The European ideas also played a big role in eroding the legitimacy of 
the Middle Eastern imperial social and political structures. The ideas of 
equality, brotherhood and justice, promoted by the French Revolution, had 
deep roots in the Middle East; nevertheless, for centuries the only 
justification of Ottoman despotism had been the need for security against 
foreign invasions and turmoil. European ideas aroused secular resentment 
against despotism. Arabs, Persians and Turks travelling to the European 
capitals in the nineteenth century could see the results of representative 
democracies, even under monarchy, the relative freedom enjoyed by 
women and their role in arts and humanities, if not in politics, and, most of 
all, the impact of modern education and industrialization (Corm 2009). 
It is within this historical context that the demands for reforms arose in 
the Arab world. The Western progress had an impact not only through a 
political system of values, but also through the Industrial Revolution that 
was arriving to the Ottoman provinces through the import-export trade 
facilitated by the Turkish Capitulations or ahdnames, i.e. concessions of 
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free trade in the empire that the sultans had arranged with the European 
powers (Emiliani 2012). Through these grants, the Christian nations had 
also obtained the right of defending the non-Muslim communities within 
the Ottoman Empire: Russia became the patron of the Orthodox 
Christians, France and Austro-Hungary of the Catholics, Great Britain of 
the Protestants and the Jewish minorities. 
The Capitulations became in that way a tool of interference because 
their counterpart was represented by the Millet, i.e. the Christian and 
Jewish communities that could profess their religion within a framework 
of limits. Through the millet system, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the European powers tried to enforce their domination by creating 
some territorial nationalisms through the Middle Eastern religious 
minorities (Maronites and Druzes in Lebanon, Chaldeans and Nestorians 
in Iraq and in Persia, Copts in Egypt, Alawites in Syria) or ethnic 
minorities (Armenians, Greek, Albanians, Kurds). In that way, the 
European powers conveyed through the Capitulations those new ideas that 
were characterizing the European modernity, such as “nation” and 
“nationalism”: in 1821 the Balkans and Greece, the provinces with the 
major presence of Christian communities, were the first ones to promote a 
rebellion against the sultan. 
Under the Ottoman Empire, the overwhelming majority of the Oriental 
Christian communities, comprising over 90 percent of the region’s native 
Christians, became relegated to the second class or the dhimmi status in 
their own ancestral homelands (Egypt’s Copts as well as the Chaldeans 
and Assyrians of Iraq and the Greek Orthodox of Syria, Palestine and 
Jordan). The word dhimmi literally means in Arabic someone who lives 
“under the protection of” (fi dhimmat) Muslims (Malik 2009, 13). The 
dhimmi category, as it was traditionally applied by the ruling Muslims to 
the conquered communities of Christians and Jews, entailed a set of 
imposed restrictions involving special taxation, distinctive dress, a ban on 
political participation, prohibiting the carrying of weapons, an expected 
deferential attitude towards Muslims, legal disadvantages, obstacles in 
building or renovating places of worship, the barring of publicly 
celebrated religious festivals, etc. The Lebanese-American historian Habib 
C. Malik points out that some apologists’ histories of Islam written by 
Westerners have described the dhimmi system as one of tolerance and 
acceptance of minorities. Today, he states, “the dhimmitude is now 
recognized for what it truly is: a premeditated system of organised and 
gradual liquidation of non-Muslim communities, or, at the very least, their 
deliberate and sustained marginalisation to the point of dehumanisation” 
(Malik 2008). The slaves, the women and the unbelievers were subject to 
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strictly enforced legal as well as social disabilities, which affected them in 
almost every aspect of their daily lives. In the course of the nineteenth 
century, voices were raised in favor of all the three groups of inferiors, and 
suggestions were made for the abrogation or at least the alleviation of their 
status of inferiority. These new trends were due in part to the influences 
and pressures from the outside; they were also affected by the changing 
attitude among the Muslims themselves (Lewis 2002). The European 
powers were unanimous in demanding the abolition of the position of legal 
inferiority assigned to Christians and incidentally also to Jews in the 
Muslim states and in using every means at their disposal to persuade the 
Muslim governments to grant equality to all their free subjects without 
discriminating on the ground of religion. The process for the emancipation 
of non-Muslims began with Bonaparte’s expedition in Egypt and ended 
with the abolition of the numerous restrictions and disabilities imposed by 
Muslim law and tradition on Christians. The brief French occupation of 
Egypt, together with the appearance of Armenians in the service of the 
advancing Russian power on the eastern frontier of Turkey, like the 
employment of Christians and occasionally Jewish subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire by the Western powers, created new tensions and 
produced new reasons for resentment among Muslim citizens. The status 
of dhimmi or protected non-Muslim subjects of the Muslim state were 
incompatible with the acceptance of the protection or patronage, 
sometimes even the citizenship, of a foreign power (Lewis 2002). Both 
were incompatible with the quest for equality of rights before the law as 
equal Ottoman citizens. This in turn was undermined by the parallel trend 
towards separation, autonomy or independence in most of the 
predominantly Christian provinces of the empire. 
Despite the difficulties, the new idea of equal citizenship for Ottoman 
subjects of different religions gained strength. It was not only supported by 
the European powers, but it was also promoted by the midcentury by a 
group of reformers among the Muslim Turks, who were trying to bring 
their country into line with what they perceived as modern enlightenment. 
The Ottoman Rescript of the Rose Bower (Hett-i Sherif edict), 
promulgated in 1839 by the young Sultan ‘Abd al Majid, launched the 
short season of the Tanzimat-i khayriyye or The Auspicious Regulations, 
the reforms that were aimed at integrating the non-Muslim minorities by 
enhancing their civil liberties and rights. Dealing with matters such as the 
security of life, honor and property, fiscal reform, the edict states that 
“these imperial concessions are extended to all our subjects, of whatever 
religion or sect they may be.” 
